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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARCELL PITCHER, 
Plaintiff anrl Respondent, 
vs. 
C. W. LAURITZEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Civil No. 
10563 
STATE_MENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover the reasonable value 
of hay and straw unlawfully taken from the plaintiff, 
and a counterclaim to specifically enforce an earnest 
money contract for the sale of the farm from which the 
hay and straw were taken, and failing that. for damages 
for breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The issues as to the value of the hay and straw, 
and whether the earnest money contract had been re-
1 
pudiated were tried to a jury, and the remaining issues 
were tried to the court. From a judgment for the plain-
tiff, the defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment, and a 
decree in his favor for specific performance of the earnest 
money contract, or failing that, for a new trial under 
the direction of this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff as "Seller" and the defendant as "Pur-
chaser" executed a document entitled, "Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase'', dated April 16, 1962, 
which provides for the sale of the "220-acre Pitcher 
farm, 60-acre Bambrough farm and 160-acre Weston 
farm together with all water rights, owner's interest in 
well, pump and sprinkler pipe" for $100,000.00. The 
sum of $100.00 was deposited and the contract provides, 
"Balance of purchase price to be paid as follows 30 
acres in North Logan as indicated by map valued at 
$50,000.00, $25,000.00 cash from loan on Seller's farm, 
and Seller to carry balance on contract or second mort-
gage at 5% interest." 
The plaintiff remained m possession of the land 
referred to in the contract and in 1962 produced crops 
of hay, grain and sugar beets. (Tr. 153, 154). Mean-
while, the defendant caused his 30 acres of land in 
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North Logan to be surveyed and a legal description of 
the land to be prepared. (Tr. 74, 158, 159). The plain-
tiff delivered his abstract to the Hickman Abstract 
Company to be brought to date for use in an effort to 
obtain the necessary $25,000.00 loan. (Tr. 73). 
The defendant talked to Ravsten, the plaintiff's 
real estate broker, every two weeks in an effort to gel 
the deal completed. (Tr. 70). He also inquired about 
the operation of the farm in 1962. (Tr. 82). Ravsten 
called the plaintiff on several occasions to get him to 
keep an appointment with the defendant, and each cime 
he was told he was too busy. (Tr. 88, 89). 
Ravsten undertook to obtain the necessary $25,-
000.00 loan for his principal. He got a commitment 
for a $25,000.00 loan on the North Logan land from 
First Federal. (Tr. 127). This was reported to the 
plaintiff and he said "he was not interested in taking 
the loan." (Tr. 150, 151). 
In August of 1962, the defendant, who was engaged 
in the dairy business, needed hay. (Tr. 66, 67, 86). His 
son Arden Lauritzen, called plaintiff's agent, Ravsten, 
and then went up to plaintiff's home to get hay and 
straw. He met plaintiff at the farm and asked him if 
it was all right to take the hay. 
" ... 'Certainly,' he said, 'take any of the hay 
you want,' he said. 'However, I'd recommend 
that you get this one particular stack which lay 
on the east side of the highway running to 'Ves-
ton.' He s,aid, 'It's down in a hollow and there's 
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a poor road at the time to it, and when the weather 
is bad, it's impassable. I recommend you get 
that before snow.' 
Q. And did you have any further conversa-
tions with him? Did he make any other state-
ments?" (Tr. 95). 
"THE COURT: Out by the haystack now. 
A. I said, 'How can you go to all of the ex-
pense to produce this crop when the farm is go-
ing to be transferred to another owner, in view 
of the fact that it's going right through the crop 
season?' or words to that effect. And he answered 
that, well, it was very pressing on him. It was 
costing him a lot of money and-but he would 
have to have some help on the beets because he'd 
spent a tremendous amount of money on the 
hand labor part of it, but that the hay and the 
grain and the straw were ours.'' (Tr. 153, 154). 
In September or October, 1962, Ravsten called 
Arden Lauritzen and told him the Pitchers' wanted 
the third crop of hay taken off so they could turn their 
cattle out. (Tr. 102). Ravsten told defendant that it 
was his hay, "come out and get it." (Tr. 193). 
The plaintiff did not say anything about the price 
of the hay and straw, nor did he orally demand pay· 
ment or send any bill. (Tr. 194) . He never asked for 
weights. (Tr. 199) . The first time defendant heard that 
plaintiff expected to be paid was when he got a letter 
from the bank in December, 1963, Defendant's Exhibit 
5. He got a letter from plaintiff's attorneys shortly 
before the action was filed. (Tr. 196) . 
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There is no evidence that the defendant refused 
to perform his contract nor that he abandoned it. The 
reason the contract was not performed is found in the 
testimony of the plaintiff. On cross-examination ~1e 
testified as follows: 
"Q. Now you testified, as I remember, on di-
rect that you were anxious to make this deal with 
Mr. Lauritzen to get money. You needed money 
to go into the pipe business. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And the reason the deal fell through was 
that you couldn't get the money on this property? 
A. That's one of the reasons. 
Q. Well, what are the other reasons? 
A. Well, we were never able to sell the prop-
erty, no other way of getting-there was no 
money forthcoming on this thing. 
Q. Well, in other words you were unable to 
sell the North Logan property? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you were trying to sell that as well as 
borrow money on your own property; is that 
right? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. And you were unable to sell the North 
Logan property? 
A. That's right. 
MRS. PITCHER: It was Bennie that was 
selling that North Logan property. 
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Q. Was it your idea, Mr. Pitcher, that this 
earnest money receipt and off er to purchase 
exhibit D-1, could not be performed by yo~ 
unless you were able to sell the North Logan 
property? 
A. That was the understanding that I had. 
Mr. Ravsten said he could sell the property, 
and I said if he could sell the property, fine and 
dandy, we'd go through with the deal, and that 
was the reason we signed it. 
Q. And when you signed the agreement, ex-
hbit D-1, did you even read it? 
A. I didn't think I had to read it. Mr. Ravsten 
told me what he'd do and that there was good 
enough for me. 
Q. And you didn't even read D-1 before you 
signed it? 
A. I didn't even read it .... " (Tr. 138-139). 
" ... Q. Well, that's the A-number one item, 
is it not? 
A. "Tell, there are other items involved too. 
Been an awful lot of increase in the value of the 
property that we have out home. We've put 
sprinkler systems and wheel moves, improved 
the property in this length of time. " (Tr. 
140). 
See also (Tr. 141-142). 
The issue of the value of the hay and straw taken 
by the defendant was submitted to a jury and the 
special verdict was accepted by the court and is within 
the evidence. The Jury was also asked to answer the 
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question, "Has any party repudiated the earnest money 
contract, exhibit l." The answer was "No." (R. 24<). 
After the special verdict \Vas returned, additional tes-
timony was taken on the remaining issues. (Tr. 118-
204). 
During the trial the defendant tendered a deed to 
the North Logan property, offered to pay $25,000.DO 
and offered to give a second mortgage to secure another 
$25,000.00. (Tr. 158-161). The tender was refused. 
(Tr. 161). In his pleadings the defendant offered to 
pay the reasonable value of the hay and strav,· in addi-
tion to the full purchase price of $100,000.00. (U. ::w j. 
It will be noted that the plaintiff pleaded that 
there had been no meeting of the minds and had 11en:r 
been a contract. (R. 25-29). He also pleaded that the 
contract was barred by the statute of frauds and that 
the contract was impossible to perform because he could 
not get a loan. (R. 25-29). He did not plead abandon-
ment of the contract. The issue of abandonment wm; 
never before the court. 
The trial court found that the earnest money re-
ceipt and offer to purchase was "a valid contract in it<; 
inception", but further found that the "agreement was 
subsequently abandoned by the parties." See finding 
of fact No. 9. (R. 40). It was also found that the 
plaintiff could not obtain a loan for $25,000.00 on his 
farm and that by reason thereof it was impossible for 
him to perform and that therefore he was "excused 
of any performance under the terms of the Earnest 
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Money Agreement." See finding of fact No. 5. (R. 38). 
The court also found that the plaintiff retained posses-
sion of his farm during the years 1962, 1963, 1964 and 
1965, paid for and harvested crops during those years 
and made valuable improvements in the sum of $20,· 
000.00 and that it would be inequitable and unjust 
to grant specific performance. ( R. 39, 40) . The trial 
court also found the value of the hay and straw to 
be as determined by the jury. (R. 39). 
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff 
for the value of the hay and straw. No disposition is 
made in the judgment of the other issues in the case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
l. The Earnest l\ioney contract is specifically 
enforceable. 
2. The finding of impossibility of performance is 
not supported by the evidence and is contrary to law. 
3. Improvement of the farm after contracting for 
its sale is not ground for denying specific performance. 
4. There is no evidence that the defendant aban· 
doned the contract. 
5. The court permitted the plaintiff to take advan· 
tage of his own default and erred in denying equitable 
relief. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE EARNEST MONEY CONTRACT IS 
SPECIFICALLY ENFORCEABLE. 
The law is well settled that "in order to do jus-
tice or prevent injustice" a valid contract for the sale 
of real estate may be specifically enforced. 
81 C.J.S. 476, 486 
Nielsen vs. Rucker, 8 Utah 2d 302, 333 P.2d 
1067 
Johnson vs. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P.2d 893 
Genola Town vs. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 
80 P.2d 930 
In the cases of Johnson vs. Jones, supra, and Niel-
sen vs. Rucker, supra, this court affirmed decrees spe-
cifically enforcing earnest money agreement closely 
resembling that involved in this suit. 
Equity will not permit a party to evade a contrac-
tual obligation merely because such party has changed 
his mind. 
Johnson vs. Jones, supra; Volk vs. Atlantic 
Acceptance & Realty Co., 139 N.J. Eq. 171, 50 
A.2d 488. 
In the Volk case the court said: 
"It is one thing to decline to compel a person 
to perform an agreement into which he has never 
decidedly entered and quite another to permit 
him to escape a peremptory contractual obliga-
tion merely because he has changed his mind. 
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The eye of equity must always strive to pierce 
every curtain of artifice." 
The trial court in the instant case made a finding 
(No. 9) the contract between the plaintiff and defend-
ant was a valid contract in its inception, (R. 40) but 
refused to order specific performance for three reasons, 
( 1) that the plaintiff had failed in an attempt to bor-
row $25,000.00 on his farm making performance im-
possible, ( 2) that since the execution of the contract 
the plaintiff had made valuable improvements which 
would unjustly enrich the defendants (R. 39, 40) and 
( 3) that the parties had abandoned the contract. These 
three reasons for denying equitable relief will be dis-
cussed under separate headings. 
2. THE FINDINGS OF IMPOSSIBILITY 
OF PERFORMANCE IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY 
TO LAW. 
The only evidence in the record relating to the 
question of impossibility is that Ravsten on behalf of 
the plaintiff unsuccessfully applied for loans on the 
farm. A loan was approved by Prudential Insurance 
Company in the amount of $12,600.00. See Exhibit 
D-9 (Tr. 123, 124). Ravsten approached the Federal 
Land Bank and Utah Mortgage Loan, but no loan 
commitment was made. (Tr. 126). 
The general rule is that impossibility arising sub-
sequent to the making of a contract does not excme 
performance. 
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17A C.J.S. p. 607 
Impossibility of performance originating in finan-
cial incapacity is not a defense. 
6 Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. Sec. 1932, 
p. 5412 
Martin vs. Star Pub. Co., (Del.) II Terry 
181, 126 A.2d 238 
Lewis vs. Harcliff Coal Co., 237 F. Supp. 6 
The obvious reason the $25,000.00 loan on the 
farm was not obtained was that the plaintiff already had 
it mortgaged to the Farmers' Home Administratiou 
for $23,000.00 and there was an "escrow" indebted-
ness of $8,000.00 on the Bambrough land (near Corn-
ish). (Tr. 130, 137). However, before the trial the 
plaintiff borowed $14,000.00 on the Bambrough prop-
erty. (Tr. 130). 
When Ravsten had difficulty borrowing money on 
the plaintiff's farm he applied to the First Federal for 
a loan on the plaintiff's farm and the North Logaa 
property. It was approved for $25,000.00. (Tr. 127). 
There was no action on it. Some months later the plain-
tiff "indicated an interest in picking up the loan as a 
source of getting money", but he could not get the 
loan then. (Tr. 128, 129). 
Under the circumstances of this case the following 
legal principle is applicable: 
" ... 'Vhere a contract is performable on the 
occurrence of a future event, there is an implied 
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agreement that the promisor will place no ob-
stacle in the way of the happening of such event, 
particularly where it is dependent in whole or 
in part on his own act; and, where he prevents, 
hinders, or renders impossible, the fulfillment of 
a condition precedent or its performance by the 
adverse party, or is himself the cause of failure 
to perform the condition, he cannot rely on such 
condition to defeat his liability. A party who 
prevents the fulfillment of a condition of his own 
obligation commits a breach of contract; and a 
party whose misconduct has rendered it futile 
as a practical matter, for the other party to ful-
fill a condition cannot complain of his failure 
to do so ... " 17A C.J.S. p. 645. 
See also 6 Corbin on Contracts, sec. 1329 p. 346. 
It is evident from the testimony of the plaintiff 
that the defense of impossibility is a subterfuge for 
the reasons stated above and for the additional reason 
that the plaintiff did not intend to perform unless the 
North Logan property was sold. (Tr. 138, 139). 
"Q. Was it your idea, 1\1-r. Pitcher, that this 
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, ex-
hibit D-1, could not be performed by you unless 
you were able to sell the North Logan property? 
A. That was the understanding that I had. 
1\1-r. Ravsten said he could sell the property, and 
I said if he could sell the property, fine and 
dandy, we'd go through with the deal, and that 
was the reason we signed it. 
Q. And when you signed the agreement, ex-
hibit D-1, did you even read it? 
A. I didn't think I had to read it. Mr. Ravste11 
12 
told me what he'd do and that there was good 
enough for me. 
Q. And you didn't even read D-1 before you 
signed it? 
A. I didn't even read it." (Tr. 139). 
3. IMPROVEMENT OF THE F ARl\1 AF-
TER CONTRACTING FOR ITS SALE IS NO 
GROUND FOR DENYING SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE. 
The trial court made a finding that during the years 
1962-1965 the plaintiff made valuable improvements 
on the farm in the sum of $20,000.00, and that it would 
be "inequitable and unjust to attempt to grant specific 
performance .... " If this reasoning is sound, a party 
seeking to avoid his obligation to perform a real estate 
contract could simply improve the real estate. The la"· 
does not support such a contention. 
In the case of Erisman vs. Overman, 11 Utah 2d 
268, 358 P.2d 85, the party in possession under a real 
estate contract made a claim for the value of improYe-
ments voluntarily made on the premises. This court 
held: 
" ... As to any claim for improvements made 
voluntarily by the defendant, there is nothing 
in this case that would justify any claim there-
for in law or in equity since they were made 
under circumstances that would not bind plain-
tiffs by any equitable doctrine of estoppel or 
the like, or under any legal or statutory inter-
diction .... " 
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4. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE 
DEFENDANT ABANDONED THE CON-
TRACT. 
The trial court made a finding that the agreement 
was abandoned by the parties. (R. 40, Finding No. 9). 
Proof of mutual abandonment involves not only the 
acts but the intentions of both parties. The following 
evidence shows a consistent effort on the part of the 
defendant to obtain performance by the plaintiff. 
The defendant: ( 1) Talked with the plaintiff's agent 
Ravsten at least once every two weeks to find out why 
the transfer papers were not completed and to check 
up on the crops. (Tr. 70). See also Ravsten's testimony 
to this effect. (Tr. 82) . ( 2) Had the North Logan 
property surveyed and legal descriptions prepared. 1 
(Tr. 74, 158, 159). (3) Had a map prepared by au 
engineer when the property was surveyed and furnished 
it to Ravsten in the fall of 1962. (Tr. 159). ( 4) Re-
moved hay and straw from the farm when the plaintiff 
said it belonged to defendant. (Tr. 153, 154). ( 5) 
Offered to pay Pitcher $2,000.00 for the hay in Au-
gust, 1962, if he would perform his agreement. (Tr. 
195). ( 6) Offered to pay $25,000.00 cash instead of 
requiring Pitcher to borrow that sum on his farm. (Tr. 
161). (7) Had his attorney write letters to the plain-
tiff in August and September, 1963, demanding that 
he perform. (See Exhibits 2 and 3.) ( 8) Never failed 
or refused to perform. (Tr. 73). (8) Had his abstract 
brought to date and all transfer papers prepared. (Tr. ' 
14 
73) . ( l 0) Tendered a deed to the North Logan prop-
erty, $25,000.00 cash and a second mortgage for an-
other $25,000.00 in open court. (Tr. 161). 
None of the facts above stated are controverted. 
There is no evidence in the record of any act of state-
ment indicating that the defendant abandoned the con-
tract. Absent proof of abandonment by both parties, 
the trial court erred in making finding of fact No. 9. 
Mutual abandonment involves an intention on the part 
of both parties to rescind or forsake the contract. 
Green vs. Garn, II Utah 2d 375, 359 P.2d 1050 
See also 6 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1826 
5. THE COURT PERMITTED THE PLAIN-
TIFF TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OWN 
DEFAULT AND ERRED IN DENYING 
EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
The plaintiff admitted on cross-examination that 
he had not even read the agreement before signing it 
and that he had never intended to "go through with 
the deal" until the North Logan property was sold. 
(Tr. 138, 139). The reasons for the evasions and delay 
are clarified by this cross-examination. The fault was 
all on the side of the plaintiff and yet the trial court 
permitted the plaintiff to use his own evasions and delay 
to defeat the defendant's clear right to equitable relief. 
This was manifestly error. 
The writer of this brief has never seen a more 
callous disregard of an obligation nor a more obvious 
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effort to repudiate. Near the close of the testimony 
the court asked the plaintiff if he would perform if 
the defendant should give him $25,000.00 in cash, a deed 
to the North Logan property and a note secured by 
a mortgage on the plaintiff's property for another 
$25,000.00. His answer vvas, "No, I couldn't do it, not 
on that." 
To carry out such a proposal the defendant offered 
in open court to pay $25,000.00 and to sign a note and 
mortgage and he tendered a deed to the 30-acre tract 
in North Logan. This was ref used. This off er would 
get for the seller the $100,000.00 purchase price set 
out in the agreement. In addition, the purchaser of-
fered in his amended pleading to pay for the hay and 
straw if specific performance was ordered. This would 
clearly meet his obligation "to do equity." 
A practical solution was reached in a similar case. 
See Haire vs. Patterson, (\Vashington) 386 P.2d 953: 
" ... The earnest money agreement, con-
sidered in its entirety, contains all of the ingredi-
ents necessary for a cash sale. The buyers are 
granted the option to pay the full consideration 
at any time, and the seller is obligated to accept 
the same. The seller has agreed to convey a mer-
chantable title by 'warranty deed, free of en-
cumbrances except - - - ' (No exceptions noted). I 
The buyers may waive defects in title and elect 
to purchase subject to them. Encumbrances may 
be paid out of the purchase money at the time of 
closing sale. The preliminary title report showed 
the property subject to the lien of a mortgage 
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to l<...,ederal Land Bank with an unpaid balance 
of about $888.29, a second mortgage to secure 
an indebtedness in the original amount of 
$646.07, and a judgment for $55.05, plus in-
terest and costs. It further disclosed the exist-
ence of an easement for travel and utilities lines 
over a strip 16 feet in width, and an oil, gas, 
an.d mineral lease entered into in 1959 for a 10-
year term with I-lumble Oil & Refining Com-
pany. We conclude that, if the respondents de-
sire the property at this time for $20,000 in 
cash and are willing to accept title subject to 
the foregoing easement and oil and gas lease, 
they are entitled to have it. 
The cause is remanded to the trial court 'with 
instructions to modify the judgment upon the 
going down of the remittitur by eliminating 
therefrom everything after the first paragraph 
ending with the words, 'NO~T THERE-
FORE,' and by inserting in lieu thereof the fol-
lowing: 
'It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that, in the event that within 30 days from the 
date hereof plaintiffs shall pay into the registry 
of this court the sum of Twenty Thousand Dol-
lars ($20,000), which sum shall be subject to 
the further order of the court, and shall notify 
defendant in writing of such deposit and of their 
election to accept title subject to the easement 
for travel and utility lines, and the oil and gas 
lease to Humble Oil & Refining Company, then 
the defendant is hereby directed to carry out 
and perform all acts necessary to effect a sale 
of the property described in Plaintiff's Exhibit 
I in accordance with the terms thereof in the 
same manner as though the plaintiffs had elected 
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to pay the entire consideration in cash. The said 
Exhibit I shall be considered as having been ex-
ecuted on the date on which plaintiffs shall notify 
the defendant of their having made the afor~­
said deposit into the registry of the court, and 
the time for the performance of the various acts 
required of the parties in said Exhibit I shall 
commence to run from said date. Upon the com-
plete performance by the plaintiffs and the de-
fendant of all acts necessary to consummate said 
sale, the court shall enter such further order 
relative to the deposit in the registry of the court 
as may appear equitable. 
'In the event that plaintiffs shall fail within 
said period of 30 days to make such deposit and 
notify defendant thereof, this action shall be 
dismissed with prejudice upon motion of defend-
ant. 
'The court hereby retains jurisdiction of this 
1 
cause for the purpose of making such orders from · 
time to time as the court may deem necessary 
and proper to make effective and to complete the 
specific performance of any and all acts required 
by this decree.' 
As so modified, the judgment is hereby af· 
firmed .... " 
See also the case of Darneille vs. Geraci, ( :\Iary· 
land) 205 A.2d 55, in which the court ordered specific 
performance against a vendor who was evasive anrl 
sought to repudiate a contract for the sale of land. This 
case is so closely in point on the facts and the law that 
we quote from it at length: 
"'Yhen as here it became clear that the sellers 
-by belately claiming that the contract of sale 
18 
was too indefinite, uncertain and ambiguous to 
specifically enforced-had no intention of going 
through with the sale in any event if that could 
be avoided, the purchaser was thereby required 
either to accept the title as it was and tender 
payment into court or take the risk of possibly 
losing his suit for specific performance. Chap-
man vs. Thomas, 211 Md. 102, 126 A.2d .579 
( 1956) . In such case, the general rule is to the 
effect that where uncertainties exist in the terms 
of a contract of sale, specific performance should 
be granted when cash is tendered in full pay-
ment of the purchase price. And where credit 
is provided for, as was the case here, it is the 
privilege of the purchaser in the absence of some 
indication to the contrary, to waive all uncer-
tainties relating to the extension of credit by 
tendering the whole (or balance) of the pur-
chase price. Ordinarily, tender not only waives 
all defects or uncertainties in the terms of credit, 
but also waives all other uncertain terms, when 
as here they are primarily for the benefit of the 
purchaser. In addition to Haire vs. Patterson, 
supra, see Blanton vs. Williams, 209 Ga. 16, 
70 S.E. 461 (1952); Levine vs. Lafayette Illdg. 
Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 121, 142 A. 441 (1928); 
Binns vs. Smith, 93 N.J. Eq. 33. 115 A. 69 
( 1921) ; Morris vs. Ballard, 56 App. D.C. 383, 
16 F.2d 175, 49 A.L.R. 1461 (1926). See also 
5 Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.) sec. 1424. 
The defendants also contend that the offer to 
pay $245,000 into court came too late. "Then, 
however, a purchaser is at all time able, ready 
and willing to perform, a tender before trial is 
not necessary where the seller has expressed his 
intention not to perform." 
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CONCLUSION 
'l'he trial court found that there was a valid con-
tract, and then refused to specifically enforce it for 
reasons set out in the findings of fact consisting of im-
possibility of performance, improvement of the prem-
ises by the plaintiff and mutual abandonment. We have 
pointed out above that the mere failure of the plaintiff 
to get a loan application approved for $25,000.00 does 
not constitute "impossibility," especially in view of the 
fact that a loan was offered on other security for the 
full amount and the defendant actually offered to pay 
the $25,000.00 in cash. The second reason for denying 
relief to the defendant, namely, that after selling the 
property the plaintiff placed valuable improvements 
thereon is equally without merit. 'l'he finding of mutual 
abandonment is not sustained by any competent evi-
dence. 
The defendant, who at all times was ready, able 
and willing to perform his contract, and who consist-
1 
ently sought, through the plaintiff's agent, Ravsten, 
to get the plaintiff to perform, is entitled to specific 
performance under such terms and conditions as will 
be just to both parties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. J. SKEEN 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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